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INTRODUCTION
It is a safe generalization that no nation should increase the
cost of raising capital except for compelling reasons. The lower the
cost of capital to a nation's entrepreneurs, the more that will be
purchased.' When further units of capital are added to a fixed
number of units of other factors of production, the return to those
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This Article was
originally presented as the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School, Cam-
bridge, Mass., on October 13, 1992.
1. For some time, many commentators noted that America's cost of capital was high
compared to that of its economic competitors. Richard Breeden, the Chairman of the
SEC, and others have described America's high cost of capital as one of the economy's
biggest problems. Richard Breeden, Speech at American Stock Exchange Conference
(Oct. 15, 1990), in Fed. News Serv., Oct. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fednew File; see, e.g., Gary Hector, Why U.S. Banks Are in Retreat, FORTUNE, May 7,
1990, at 95, 95 (stating that the cost of capital for American companies was twice that of
their West German and Japanese competitors during the period from 1983 to 1988).
More recent evidence indicates that America's cost of capital is not currently higher
than the cost of capital for some of its competitors. See, eg., Capital Punishment, ECON-
OMIST, May 23, 1992, at 71, 71 (discussing a recent study conducted by Richard
Mattione, an economist with J.P. Morgan Bank, that found America's cost of capital to
be lower than the cost of Japanese capital); Carl W. Kester & Timothy A. Luehrman,
The Myth of Japan's Low-Cost Capital, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 130, 130;
Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 65.
It should be emphasized that the validity of the arguments made here does not
depend upon the cost of capital in the United States being relatively high or low. Mea-
sures that increase the cost of capital without corresponding benefits are harmful.
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other factors is increased. For example, hypothesize two comple-
mentary factors of production that jointly produce products. The
first factor is capital, domestic and foreign. We assume it to be
extremely mobile. The second factor, domestic labor, we assume
to be fixed in amount. Governmental measures that reduce the
cost of capital will increase the return to labor as each additional
unit of capital purchased competes for the fixed units of labor.
Governmental measures that increase the cost of capital will in
turn diminish the return to labor.
It is self-evident to all who would look that societies whose
governments facilitate the raising of capital thrive while those
whose governments impair the raising of capital suffer. These
propositions are supported by empirical evidence all over the
planet. They are so obvious that their message can be learned
even from the nightly television news, although it is not clear that
the messenger understands it. These propositions need be restated
only when one is in proximity to a great American university.
The international competition for capital is for high stakes.
Trillions of dollars are involved. Moreover, the flow of capital
among nations is independent of the desires of governments. Capi-
tal cannot be captured, hoarded, or reproduced; it must be attract-
ed on a continual basis. The swiftness of modern communication2
and the sophistication of international securities markets3 result in
instantaneous responses to events affecting the return to investors.
That these market responses are relatively immune from control
by individual or even collective governments was recently demon-
strated by the monetary disarray in the European Community.4
2. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets:
Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 349, 103-04 (1990).
3. A plethora of articles detail the increasing sophistication of both financial instru-
ments and market participants. See, eg., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of
Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE LJ. 387, 401-04 (1992)
(discussing the ways in which investors use swaps, options, or futures to achieve returns
similar to those achieved through equity holdings); Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Prod-
ucts, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (1991); Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial
Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1319 (1991).
4. During the latter half of September 1992, "massive movements of short-term
capital have overwhelmed the attempts of central banks to defend [the European
Community's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)] parities with market intervention and/or
changes in interest rates." The Way We Were, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1992, at 71, 71. "[TIhe
ERM may be torn apart beyond repair" because of such tremendous volatility in the
currency markets. Enhancing European Equities: Europe's Exchange-Rate Shambles Has
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The character of a national legal system directly affects the
cost of raising capital in that nation. For example, a principal
deterrent to private investment in the former Soviet Union is the
fear that its judicial system will not enforce contracts5 Entrepre-
neurs in a nation with a legal system that lessens the return to
private investment relative to other legal systems will have to pay
more for capital, and will purchase less, than entrepreneurs in
other nations. A nation's legal system is thus as much in competi-
tion with those of other nations as are, say, its automobile compa-
nies.
The theme of this Article is that the American legal system
unnecessarily raises the cost of capital and thus retards economic
growth. By "unnecessarily," I mean that there are legal rules and
procedures that are inefficient because they raise the cost of capi-
tal but do not purport to further societal goals that outweigh the
loss in efficiency. In fact, most of the areas of law that I intend to
address purport to further, if anything, the efficiency of capital
markets. Judgments about these legal rules and procedures entail a
cost-benefit analysis that is exceedingly difficult. Such judgments
also require observation over a period of time. If a rule or regula-
tory scheme endures over time, it is reasonable to assume that it
survives either because it is efficient or because it benefits power-
ful domestic interests.6
There is, of course, virtually no legal rule in corporate or
securities law that is not alleged by someone to raise the cost of
capital. I am not here to debate the close cases, however, or even
the cases in which we can be confident there are substantial bene-
fits.7 It is my belief that the American legal system contains vari-
ous bodies of law that raise the cost of capital to benefit powerful
domestic interests. The bodies of law I have chosen to examine
either expose investors to unjustified civil and criminal liability
Made Securities Markets Nervous, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 91, 91.
5. See, eg., Duncan Robinson, Weak Russian Contract Enforcement Takes Toll on
Companies from US, J. COM., July 31, 1992, at A4.
6. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAw 31, 217 (1991).
7. I am not going to address registration and periodic disclosure provisions. They
may be inefficient, but an argument can be made that they are efficient. See generally id.
at 276-314. My own view is that they will die of their own accord because they are inef-
ficient enough that they deter foreign companies from choosing to register their stock in
this country.
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which benefits only the legal profession or shield corporate manag-
ers from the monitoring of their performance by equity investors
and the threat of control changes.
I. UNJUSTIFIED EXPOSURE TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Unnecessary civil or criminal liability diminishes the return to,
and increases the cost of, capital. When a rule of liability is not
efficient, the payment by firms of damages or fines unnecessarily
increases the cost of doing business in the United States. Of
course, many investors can diversify in part against those liabilities.
They may invest in a broad range of companies that pay damages
to each other, and investors' losses in some companies will be
matched by gains in others. Even when diversified, investors still
must pay the costs of determining the underlying liability-the
costs of litigation. Moreover, the entrepreneurs whose companies
purchase capital cannot diversify against unnecessary liability; they
will not, at the margin, purchase capital, at least not in the coun-
try in question.
The second effect of unnecessary civil and criminal liability is
that participants in the capital market, including intermediaries and
managers, may be deterred from engaging in efficient conduct by
the fear of such liability.
A. Derivative/Class Actions
Of course, even efficient rules of liability will misfire if the
available enforcement procedures are inefficient; and a good start-
ing point of analysis is the use of derivative and class actions to
enforce managerial or corporate obligations. In these actions, the
named plaintiffs are individual shareholders who bring actions on
behalf of the corporation or on behalf of a class of shareholders.
The plaintiffs are generally figureheads, however, because the real
incentive for bringing such actions is the quest for attorney's
fees.' In theory, such actions vindicate legal rights that might oth-
erwise go un- or underenforced when no single claimant has a
sufficiently large claim to have an incentive to sue. But the costs
of collective action in marshalling a large group of claimants are
8. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Re-
form, 58 U. CHL L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1991).
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great, particularly because claimants who sit back may get a "free
ride," benefitting from a victory without bearing any cost.
There is increasing evidence, however, that, under existing
procedures, derivative and class actions substantially diminish the
return to investors in American companies.9 First, studies by vari-
ous scholars over the years have revealed that a large percentage
of derivative and class actions are frivolous." Because even frivo-
lous cases must be defended, investors must bear costs without
any corresponding benefit other than a hope for deterrence. When
a frivolous action cannot be dismissed on the pleadings, and dis-
covery is taken, these costs may be substantial.
Because the motivation for bringing the action is the quest for
attorney's fees, many such actions may be brought on the basis of
their settlement value, which may be related more to the expected
costs of defense than to the merits of the underlying claim. 2 One
study has found that fifty percent of derivative actions that settle
do so for no monetary recovery although an award of counsel fees
is made in ninety percent of the settled cases.1 3 The studies also
show that a large monetary award to the corporation or to the
class is unusual.1 4 Some transactions, like public offerings, gener-
ate litigation whenever investors have lost an amount sufficient to
support an award of attorney's fees." A study of public offerings
in one industry thus found that where damages above a certain
floor could be claimed and financially sound defendants were
available, a class action based on allegations of misrepresentation
9. See; e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implica-
tions of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 673 n.9 (1986) (many such suits result in settlements
that "benefit[] the attorneys more than the shareholders"). See generally Janet C. Alexan-
der, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 497, 569-73 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 55 (1991) (concluding that shareholder
litigation, as an instrument of corporate governance, is weak, if not ineffective).
10. See e.g., FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCK-
HOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944); Romano, supra note 9, at 56, 61.
11. See Roberta Romano, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: What Went
Wrong?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 67, 69 (Walter Olson ed., 1988) (stating
that the cost of the average claim in a 1986 survey was $1,988,200, excluding attorney's
fees).
12. Id. at 69-70; Alexander, supra note 9, at 566-68.
13. Romano, supra note 9, at 61.
14. See; e.g., id. at 60-65.
15. See Romano, supra note 11, at 72.
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or inadequate disclosure was brought on every occasion that the
value of newly-issued stock was, within fifteen months after the
offering, less than its offering price." Because some new issues
will inevitably sell at prices lower than their offering prices even
after the most meticulous and comprehensive disclosure, the incen-
tive to bring at least some of these actions was probably not the
merits.
Second, there is increasing evidence that settlement is inevita-
ble where judgment on the pleadings or 'a quick summary judg-
ment cannot be obtained, and that the amounts paid in settlement
are in large part unrelated- to the merits of the action." Weak
actions may thus be overcompensated, and strong actions
undercompensated. If so, fiduciary and other obligations will not
be effectively enforced. Because enforcement of these obligations
is the sole justification for such actions, this is serious criticism
indeed.
The parties have powerful incentives to settle such actions.
The defense may find settlement attractive to avoid costly pre-trial
and trial proceedings." The defense will also want to avoid the
irreducible risk of loss in even the weakest case that results from
the inherent unpredictability of our judicial system. Manage-
ment, moreover, rarely cares to assume the burdens and distrac-
tions of a trial.
Once a settlement offer with a significant fee is on the table,
the temptation for plaintiffs' counsel to settle is powerful.2' A
larger recovery may be possible, but the percentage of the in-
crease going to counsel fees is likely to diminish. Moreover,
further proceedings will impose substantial out-of-pocket costs on
plaintiffs' counsel, who will generally be financing the case.' In
16. This study is the focus of Alexander's article. See Alexander, supra note 9, at
511-13.
17. See id. at 500, 514-15, 519, Romano, supra note 9, at 61.
18. Alexander, supra note 9, at 529-34.
19. See, eg., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Set-
tlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MiCH. L REV. 319, 320
(1991) (stating that the "uncertainties of trial" provide some of the incentives "driv[ing]
parties to settle").
20. See Romano, supra note 9, at 57.
21. Judge Friendly discussed this in his separate opinion in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby,
333 F.2d 327, 338 (2d Cir. 1964), affd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dis-
missed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
22. 'Alexander has observed that plaintiffs' firms usually absorb all out-of-pocket costs
[Vol. 42:945
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such circumstances, plaintiffs' counsel will rarely decline a settle-
ment providing a significant fee and risk actually losing the
case.
23
There are thus compelling reasons for all parties to settle that
are relatively extraneous to the merits of plaintiffs' claims. As a
result, settlement values may reflect those reasons more than the
merits of the underlying action. One study of a group of class
actions found that most settlement values fell within a rather nar-
row range-20% to 27.5%-of the claimed damages.24
Third, amounts paid in settlement in derivative actions and
the costs of litigation are more often than not paid from insurance
that was purchased by the corporation.' Viewing such cases in
the aggregate, investors do not net any return over premiums
paid.26
In the case of class actions, a transfer from the corporation to
a class of investors may take place.27 However, some investors
will suffer a loss from the indemnification of the defendants and
the funding of the costs of litigation for all parties. Investors who
are diversified against such transfers will suffer a net loss from the
costs of the litigation. Investors who receive damages will benefit,
but the amounts will not be great.2
for the litigation and typically will-not want to risk losing such an investment, as well as
their expected profit from a settlement, on the risks inherent in a trial. For example,
four plaintiffs' firms, including Milberg, Weiss, invested four million dollars in a lawsuit
against Marathon Oil and lost at trial. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 537 n.156. To
generate a regular and steady profit, plaintiffs' firms normally commence many cases with
some settlement value, invest only a limited amount of time on each, and settle them all.
Id. at 547.
23. Id. at 543-44.
24. In Alexander's study, six of the eight cases settled in this narrow range, with five
of them falling in the even tighter range of 24.5% to 27.5%. Id. at 517. Her findings are
significant because cases in her study involved damage claims based on mathematically
precise computations. Id. at 515 n.55.
25. See Romano, supra note 9, at 57, 61-62. See generally Romano, supra note 11, at
68-7o.
26. See Nancy Rutter, Securities Class Action Scandal, UPSIDE, Apr. 1990, at 18, 34
(stating that directors' and officers' insurance contributes roughly 50% to 80% of the set-
tlement amount in securities class actions); see also Romano, supra note 9, at 55-56.
27. See, eg., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 260-63 (1988) (White, J., dissent-
ing). The Basic decision held that shareholders who kept their shares must pay damages
to shareholders who had sold the stock between October 1977 and December 1978.
28. Seventy-four percent of shareholder claims are settled without any payments
made to the claimants. Romano, supra note 11, at 70. Also, any payments made to
claimants are typically small. Derivative suits pay "[a]s a percentage of firm assets ...
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It is, of course, argued that the existence of derivative and
class actions deters illegal conduct. This assertion cannot be tested
in full, but existing data suggests that the deterrent effect is weak.
Certainly, if the merits of claims asserted in derivative and class
actions are frequently irrelevant to their initiation or settlement
values, one would not expect the existence of such actions to have
a deterrent effect beneficial to investors. To be sure, the existence
of such actions may impel management to take steps to prevent
such litigation. Such steps, however, are at a cost and of little
benefit to investors.
The evidence thus suggests the following. Derivative and class
actions extract a deadweight loss from investors. In most such
actions, the corporation receives no benefit but pays everyone's
legal fees. In some cases, a benefit is received but is either paid
from insurance that was purchased by the corporation or offset by
indemnification. Because settlement is guided only in small part by
the merits of the underlying claim, derivative and class actions
result in the overcompensation of weak claims and the under-
compensation of strong claims. Investors thus also lose because
fiduciary or statutory obligations-which I assume to be effi-
cient-are not effectively enforced.
Present procedures are a cause of these problems. Rules of
notice pleading followed by discovery expose investors to litigation
that lacks merit but is expensive to defend. The requirement of
judicial approval of derivative or class action settlements has failed
to fulfill its purpose of protecting shareholders-busy trial judges
cannot seriously test claims by all parties that a proposed settle-
ment is fair.
What then is needed? First, we should require that derivative
and class actions be pled with particularity-a result accomplished
in the case of derivative actions in some jurisdictions through the
demand requirement.29 Second, in each such case, a judicial offi-
cer, such as a special master, should be appointed to make a judg-
much less (0.5 percent compared to 1.6 percent)" than do class actions. Romano, supra
note 9, at 61. Also, "[t]he proportion of derivative suits with a cash payout to
shareholders (21 percent) is significantly lower than that of class actions (67 percent)."
Id.
29. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817-18 (Del. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff
did not allege facts with sufficient particularity). But see Alexander, supra note 9, at 570
n.287 (noting that the procedural nature of such a requirement may adversely affect cases
based on meritorious grounds).
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ment at periodic intervals as to whether investors will benefit if
the lawsuit continues. In a derivative action, if, at any time, the
officer determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted
by the probability of a finding of liability are not substantially
greater than the likely costs to the corporation, then the action
should be dismissed. In a class action, if the class is not the share-
holders as a whole, the officer should determine whether the likely
benefits to the class discounted by the probability of liability out-
weigh the likely costs of bringing the litigation; the officer should
then monitor the case, including discovery, and guide its settle-
ment. This procedure is itself costly, but it carries a hope that
weak claims will be deterred or quickly dismissed, and strong
claims will not be settled at inadequate amounts. If those goals
were to be achieved, we might be justified in believing that such
actions would act as effective deterrents of illegal conduct.
B. The Increasing Importance of Criminal Law
One can no longer teach or practice in the area of corporate
or securities law without being attentive to the possible exposure
of the corporation or its managers to criminal liability. This liabili-
ty has become important for a number of reasons, including: new
attitudes on the part of prosecutors, the substantial penalties that
now may be levied on corporations under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the extraordinary breadth the federal courts accord the
definition of fraud in the mail and wire fraud statutes, and the use
of forfeiture as an adjunct to criminal RICO and money launder-
ing prosecutions.
With regard to the size of fines to which a corporation may
be subjected, the United States Sentencing Commission recently
promulgated Guidelines for the sentencing of corporations convict-
ed of crimes.' Although the size of a potential fine can be sub-
stantially diminished by proof that a corporation had in place
prophylactic measures designed to ensure compliance with applica-
ble law,31 the fines that may be imposed are substantial.32 How-
ever, prosecutors have in the past rarely sought to subject corpora-
30. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (Nov.
1991) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
31. Id. § 8C2.5(f) (allowing court to subtract three points from culpability score if
defendant had effective program in place to prevent and detect violation).
32. See id. § 8C2.4(d) (creating a range of fines from $5,000 to $72,500,000).
19931
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tions to criminal liability.3 The reasons for this are unclear. The
incidence of corporate crime may be less than we think, or the
prosecution of the executives directly responsible may be the most
effective deterrent. Prosecutors may also be wary of initiating a
complex prosecution that involves areas of the law with which
their office is unfamiliar and risks the consumption of enormous
resources. Finally, the lack of severe-and perhaps high visibility
or video-friendly-penalties may have deterred prosecutors from
embarking on such litigation. If so, the new Guidelines' provision
of substantial penalties may well alter prosecutorial attitudes about
indicting corporations.
If imposed, these fines will go to the bottom line and dimin-
ish the return to investors. Indeed, the very purpose of the draco-
nian Guidelines is to expose investors to substantial losses so that
they will monitor corporate managers' compliance with the law.'
This is a straightforward theory, weakened by the persistent query
of why prosecution of the responsible individuals is not a sufficient
deterrent, and then thoroughly undermined by the fact that Amer-
ican law-as I describe later-makes it very difficult for investors
to engage in the kind of monitoring contemplated by the Guide-
lines.
With regard to the statutory weapons available to prosecutors,
they rank by analogy with hydrogen bombs on stealth aircraft.
Foremost among them are' the various federal fraud statutes-in
particular, the mail and wire fraud statutes35-- which have been
interpreted to criminalize a wide range of conduct involving con-
flicts of interest,' alleged misrepresentations,' or the failure of
agents to inform alleged principals of certain facts.' The mail
fraud statute was designed largely to keep mail-order houses hon-
33. Jed S. Rakoff, The Corporation as Policeman: At What Price?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9,
1992, at 3, 4 ("[C]urrent federal law provides a sweeping basis for prosecuting corpora-
tions .... Yet, until recently, federal prosecutors rarely made use of this weapon.").
34. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71 B.U.
L REv. 421, 430 (1991).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 1991) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); see also
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (conspiracy).
36. Se4 ag., United States v. Silvaro, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987); United
States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
37. See, eg., United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Stout, 965 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1992).
38. See eg., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983).
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est and to prevent swindlers from using the mails.3 9 The expan-
sion of the statutory prohibitions probably resulted from the desire
of federal prosecutors to prosecute corrupt local officials who
enjoyed protection from local prosecution. The underlying doc-
trine, however, which posits a duty of agents to inform their prin-
cipals of material facts such as kickbacks, quickly spread to other
areas, such as corporate governance.'
Federal anti-fraud legislation has been construed to criminalize
the failure of corporate managers, employees, or agents to give a
meticulously accurate account to the corporation of their conduct
on the corporation's behalf.4' This doctrine is not as desirable as
it sounds. Proof of the existence of an obligation to disclose recog-
nized by some other body of law, such as state fiduciary principles
or federal securities law, is unnecessary;42 the jury can find that a
federal obligation to disclose arose from the particular facts.4 3 It
is thus essentially a common law crime fashioned by individual ju-
ries. That no loss to the corporation was intended or occurred is
not a defense." Reliance by the principal on the absence of dis-
closure need not be proven. The prosecution thus need not show
that the corporation or its shareholders would have acted differ-
ently had it or they known the facts.45
All that need be shown to prove the crime is that "material"
information was deliberately not disclosed by an agent to a princi-
pal. "Material" is given the broadest possible definition and specif-
ically does not have to relate to any matter affecting share
price.' Proof of a failure to disclose is in most circumstances
sufficient for a prima facie case, the defendant's state of mind
being a question of fact for the jury. Thus, the unexplained use of
39. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987); see also Durland v.
United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
40. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 463 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); United States v.
Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 463; Weiss, 752 F.2d at 784; Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14.
42. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 23 (Winter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
43. Id.
44. Weiss, 752 F.2d at 783-85; see also United States v. Shareef, 714 F.2d 232, 234
(2d Cir. 1983).
45. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 463, 465; Weiss, 752 F.2d at 783-84.
46. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14 (holding that the prosecution "need not show that' direct,
tangible economic loss resulted to the scheme's intended victims").
1993]
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a small cash fund,47 the failure of a company's books to reflect
an investment,' and the failure of a lawyer to include a descrip-
tion of lobbying services in a bill where substantial legal work was
done 9 all have been held to violate federal criminal fraud stat-
utes.
The supposition that the beneficiaries of this body of law are
investors is clearly a fiction. Shareholders care little about petty
cash, do not concern themselves with the details of a firm's invest-
ments, and most decidedly have no desire to rummage through a
lawyer's bills. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to argue that this
essentially judge-made law is necessary to protect investors in light
of the comprehensive state and federal regulatory schemes govern-
ing the conduct of corporate affairs,5 ° including fiduciary obliga-
tions, the doctrine of waste, the regulation of accounting practic-
es,51 and mandated disclosure of material information.52
This body of fraud law has developed case by case as prose-
cutors either have sought to prosecute persons who had engaged
in perceived improprieties that were not the subject of any partic-
ular statute or have tried to squeeze corporate managers for testi-
mony about the criminal activities of third parties. In the cash
fund case, the prosecutors hoped they were on the trail of corrupt
Teamsters officials;53 in the undisclosed investment case, they
were after a CEO; 54 and in the case of the lawyer's bills, they
were reportedly after a former Attorney General of the United
States, who they thought might have acted improperly in recom-
mending the allocation of government contracts.55
In any event, courts acceded to the desire of prosecutors for
the creation of amorphous crimes that would allow prosecutors to
pursue hard-to-define improprieties-or conduct that was improper
47. ld. at 11.
48. Weiss, 752 F.2d at 781.
49. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 450-51, 460-61.
50. See, e.g., DEL GEN. CORP. L. § 144 (1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 713 (1986); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-14 (1992).
51. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02 (1992) (accountants' reports).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988); id. § 78m.
53. United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
54. RIcHARD M. CLURMAN, To THE END OF TiME 111 (1992).
55. See Steven Brill, Nightmare at Foley Square; An Open Letter to Bob Wallach's
Prosecutor, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1991, at 3, 89.
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only in the eyes of the particular prosecutor--or to pressure indi-
viduals thought to possess knowledge of other criminal activities.
The creation of these crimes by the federal courts was not, I be-
lieve, an unconscious act. Rather, it was in part an act of faith
and in part a desire to avoid seeming acquiescence in corrupt
conduct. The act of faith was the belief that the effect of the
unbounded doctrines they were creating would always be tem-
pered by a prudential exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Civil
RICO-of which more later-never entered their mind.
Prosecutors are also empowered with broad authority to for-
feit the assets of businesses. RICO's forfeiture provisions authorize
the government to forfeit corporate assets that are the proceeds,
or derived from the proceeds, of a RICO violation or that repre-
sent the interest of an individual RICO violator in the firm. 6
Beyond seizing property, the government can become a proprietor,
such as a partner in a firm." Pre-trial restraints are available to
secure the government's monetary interests.58 Whether the forfei-
ture occurs pre-trial or post-trial is probably less important than
the announcement in an indictment that the government will seek
forfeiture. That announcement is likely to doom the firm because
of its effect on potential investors, customers, or clients. In that
event, innocent investors and employees will suffer.59
Even more awesome are the government's civil forfeiture
powers under the money laundering statute.' Any corporation
that engages in a financial transaction involving proceeds from
illegal activity with the intent to promote that activity is subject to
forfeiture.61 The government need not prove that the defendant
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
57. Id. § 1963(g)(5).
58. Id § 1963(d).
59. See William Safire, The End of RICO, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989, at A17 (stating
that the threat of pre-trial seizure of assets---"an abuse of prosecutorial power made
possible by RICO--caused Drexel Burnham Lambert to settle with 'rough Rudy'
Giuliani"); David A. Vise, RICO Goes to Wall St.; Racketeer Law's Impact Felt Even
Before Verdict in First Case, WASH. POST, July 30, 1989, at H1 (describing Prince-
ton/Newport Partners' forced liquidation "after nervous investors withdrew their capital
from the firm after RICO charges were filed").
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see Elkan Abramowitz, Money
Laundering: The New RICO?, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 1, 1992, at 3 (discussing benefits to prose-
cutors of the money laundering statutes).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 982 (Supp. III 1991).
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knew that the conduct constituted specified unlawful activity.62
Although passed largely as a measure in the "war on drugs," the
money laundering statute applies to proceeds from violations of
the mail and wire fraud statutes.
However, exposure is one thing; actual resort to forfeiture in
a way that harms innocent investors is another. The effect of
forfeiture laws on investment in U.S. companies is probably de
minimis. Forfeiture appears to have been sought in money laun-
dering cases only in the instance of relatively serious crimes in-
volving companies without innocent investors.'
The use of RICO forfeiture is another matter. The govern-
ment did seek pre-trial restraint and forfeiture under RICO of
some of the assets of a small investment partnership, Prince-
ton/Newport Partners, in the hope of obtaining testimony from
some of its general partners against Drexel Burnham Lambert and
Michael Milken." The charges against the partnership were at
best garden variety,65 however, and violated Department of Jus-
tice Guidelines as to the use of RICO.' Indeed, on appeal, the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New
York took the position that the Department of Justice Guidelines
were not binding on it, were not enforceable by the courts, and
were, in any event, wrong.67 In contrast, RICO forfeiture was not
sought in the Pentagon fraud cases,' probably because the gov-
ernment did not care to destroy the defense industry, even though
the crimes there were more egregious than any other white-collar
crimes of the era.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 982 (Supp. 111 1991).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Swank Corp., 797 F. Supp. 497, 504 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(involving millions of dollars and a defendant who is president and sole stockholder of
corporation); United States v. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 262 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (attempting
to conceal over $600,000 from trustee and creditors in bankruptcy proceeding).
64. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
65. See United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 825, 829 (2d Cir.), amended, 946 F.2d
188 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Zarzecki v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2273
(1992).
66. 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEY's MANUAL,
§ 9-110.300-.330 (1988).
67. Brief for Appellee United States at 64-65, Regan, 937 F.2d at 823 (No. 89-1591);
see also Vise, supra note 59, at H1 (stating that "[p]rosecutors deny using RICO as a
sledgehammer to try to force cooperation").
68. Pentagon Fraud Unit's Work Resulted in $8.3 Million in Fines, Restitution, Daily
Rep. Execs. (BNA) A16 (Feb. 2, 1987).
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Forfeiture is thus more a brooding threat than an active de-
terrent to investment. Still, the power is vast, and the Department
of Justice may not reliably control its use by individual prosecu-
tors. Like sizeable fines under the Sentencing Guidelines, forfei-
ture is a video-friendly, attention-getting remedy, and the danger
of its misuse persists. Moreover, a corporation faced with the
possibility of forfeiture must settle with the government prior to
indictment, or suffer bankruptcy, whereupon the merits of the
government's case will be settled by competing bestsellers.
C. Civil RICO
RICO provides civil remedies, including treble damages and
attorney's fees.69 Civil RICO builds upon the doctrines of federal
criminal law I have described. For civil RICO plaintiffs, the most
useful provision of RICO is 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1962(c)
prohibits participation in the conduct of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Anyone injured in their business
or property by such participation has standing to sue.7" "Enter-
prise" is defined broadly to include "any individual," "group of
individuals associated in fact," and various specified legal enti-
ties.7' Proof of the existence of an enterprise is thus not difficult.
"Pattern of racketeering activity" requires as a necessary condition
proof of commission of two predicate racketeering acts.72 It also
requires proof of continuity of the racketeering activity and of a
relationship between the racketeering acts proven and a relation-
ship between those acts and the conduct of the enterprise.73
Racketeering acts consist of violations of specified federal criminal
statutes-including mail and wire fraud and "fraud in the sale of
securities"-and generic state crimes. 71
As I indicated earlier, mail and wire fraud precedents estab-
lish federal fiduciary obligations broader than those established
under state law by the doctrine of waste. For example, an allega-
tion of a failure to inform shareholders that a particular economy
69. See 18 U.S:C. § 1964(c) (1988).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 1961(4).
72. See Id. § 1961(5).
73. See H. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1989); United
States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. iI 1991).
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has not been taken advantage of, or that a particular perk, salary,
or bonus is excessive, may well state a valid claim. The federal
fraud doctrines involving a failure to inform do not include a
business judgment defense. It is thus not difficult to allege a pat-
tern of racketeering activity where periodic or repetitive conduct is
involved, or to bring a RICO derivative suit alleging, for example,
participation in a corporation's board of directors through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.75 I do not, of course, mean to sug-
gest that such an action, if pursued to judgment, would inevitably
succeed. Rather, the point is that so long as the complaint survives
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the action must be de-
fended, and, as described earlier, it will be settled entirely at
investors' expense. Thus, the number of derivative suits is likely to
increase over time as a result of civil RICO, and, if the criticism
of derivative actions described above is even remotely legitimate,
RICO derivative suits will be a further deadweight loss to inves-
tors.
The definition of mail or wire fraud is also sufficiently broad
to allow rather ordinary commercial disputes to be pled as RICO
claims. As one commentator has stated, "Civil RICO is potentially
applicable to almost any commercial controversy, even one predi-
cated on state law, such as a breach of contract claim. All that is
required to 'federalize' a fundamentally state law claim is finding
two suitable predicate acts.., that can be said to form a pat-
tern."7 6 For example, any dispute over a contract that requires
periodic performance and communication between the parties can
support allegations of a pattern of racketeering activity involving
misleading statements and failures to inform.' Indeed, the first
civil RICO case to reach the Supreme Court would have been a
garden variety contract action had RICO not been available.78
One result of civil RICO is that its treble damages provisions
have partially displaced common law rules concerning contract
damages.79 This has occurred without, as far as I know, any con-
75. See, eg., In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Derivative Action, 750 F. Supp. 641, 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680-81 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
76. Gary P. Naftalis, Civil Rico: Basic Applications, in RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
LAW AND STRATEGY § 2.02[4] (Jed S. Rakoff & Howard W. Goldstein eds., 1992) (foot-
note omitted).
77. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., 879 F.2d 10, 18 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
78. Sedima, S.P.R.IL. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492, 498 (1985).
79. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil
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scious decision that the common law measure of damages was
inadequate. Similarly, the federal securities laws contain numerous
provisions specifying rights of private action in carefully defined
circumstances with particularized procedures and measures of
damages. No one consciously decided that such remedies are inad-
equate, but RICO arguably authorizes a treble damages action for
any securities law violation.
Civil RICO enhances the temptation to resort to litigation
over every commercial dispute because the prospect of treble
damages and attorney's fees is incentive to plaintiffs to bring ac-
tions that might otherwise not have been brought. Although some
investors can diversify against civil RICO liability-but not against
the costs of litigation-entrepreneurs at the margin will forgo
raising capital to fund commercial activities subject to RICO
claims. Civil RICO thus reduces the level of commercial activity in
this country. None of this analysis is dependent upon a great num-
ber of civil RICO claims ultimately prevailing because the threat
of treble damages and an award of attorney's fees creates incen-
tives on the part of defendants to settle even those cases with
little merit.
Although ordinary commercial disputes pled as RICO claims
are now commonplace-the Wall Street Journal recently reported
that there are 2,000 civil RICO claims pending against lawyers and
accountants alone--they are just the camel's nose under the
flap of the tent. Courts presently tend to scrutinize civil RICO
claims with far more skepticism than they scrutinize criminal
RICO charges. Nevertheless, rules within a single court that differ
with regard to the elements of predicate acts and the existence of
a RICO pattern depending on whether the action is civil or crimi-
nal must inevitably be reconciled-as has happened in en banc
proceedings in the Second Circuit."1
Civil RICO continues to exist, based on the argument that
persons injured by criminal acts should be allowed to recover
damages for those injuries. However, as I noted earlier, the feder-
RICO's Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 636-37 (1990); see also
EASTERBROOK & FIscHEL, supra note 6,-at 329-33.
80. Limit of Anti-Racketeering Law Is Main Issue in High Court Case, WALL ST. .,
Oct. 13, 1992, at B1.
81. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc);
Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386, 1389 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, judg-
ment vacated, and case remanded, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
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al law of fraud was fashioned not as a comprehensive definition of
criminal acts but as an amorphous body of law empowering feder-
al prosecutors to pursue individuals selected as targets on the basis
of criteria having little to do with fraud in any conventional sense.
Most decidedly, the federal law of fraud was intended to be tem-
pered by prosecutorial discretion-indeed, was intended to be used
sparingly-and was not to be available for wholesale use by civil
litigants, as it is under civil RICO.
D. The Overbreadth of Doctrine and the Lack of Bright Lines
It is also the case that prosecutors, regulators, and the courts
rarely show any appreciation of the need to avoid overbroad and
amorphous doctrine and to craft legal rules with bright lines as a
means of reducing the cost of capital. Overbreadth and uncertainty
deter beneficial conduct and breed costly litigation.
The culture of prosecutors in these areas of law is to seek
rules that are palpably overbroad so that they have a broad arse-
nal of weapons to use against suspected wrongdoers. In Chiarella
v. United States,82 prosecutors sought a rule that anyone who
traded on the basis of information not available to other traders
was guilty of insider trading. But unequal information in capital
markets is ubiquitous. Were people not able to trade on superior
information, the pricing of securities would be inaccurate. The rule
desired by the prosecutors thus would have rendered capital mar-
kets less, rather than more, efficient. It would, however, have
afforded prosecutors vast discretion.
In United States v. Mulheren, 3 the government, having failed
to prove that the defendant had for a quid pro quo manipulated
stock prices at Ivan Boesky's behest-acts that were crimi-
nal-sought on appeal a ruling that buying stock solely with an
intent to cause its price to increase was illegal manipulation.'
That such a rule would be loony mattered less to the prosecutors
than that it would convict this defendant and arm prosecutors with
yet more discretionary power.
82. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
83. 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991).
84. Id. at 368-69; see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Meaning of "Mulheren", N.Y. LJ.,
July 25, 1991, at 5 (arguing that courts should focus on evidence of criminal intent in
cases of white-collar crime).
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Legal rules and remedies that cause targets to fold without a
trial are considered optimal by prosecutors. Fraud charges and
forfeiture are the prosecutors' apple pie and baseball. They under-
standably believe that they can be trusted to limit the application
of overbroad doctrine to those who truly are wrongdoers.
Matters are not that simple, however. First, as discussed,
overbroad criminal law doctrine is available to civil litigants under
RICO. Second, such unchecked power-and it is enormous, raw
power-is very troubling in a democratic society. Even if prosecu-
tors are an unusually fair-minded segment of society, at least iso-
lated prosecutorial abuses are inevitable. In busy offices, individual
prosecutors may be relatively unsupervised. Moreover, federal
prosecutors are trained to be trial lawyers who can get convictions
and may be entirely ignorant of the working of capital markets.
As well, as demonstrated in the Princeton/Newport Partners
case,' the Department of Justice may not be able to control in-
dividual prosecutorial decisions.
Third, overbroad doctrine tends to deter beneficial activity
and to undermine capital markets. Concerns about overdeterrence
appear not to figure in prosecutorial decisions to seek judicial
approval of overbroad doctrine. What prosecutors often do not
realize is that overdeterrence in regulating capital markets, in
contrast to overdeterrence in controlling other kinds of crime, will
deter activity that we wish to encourage. For example, if a person
who was near a drug transaction but not part of it were convicted
of a narcotics offense, it would be a miscarriage of justice and a
personal tragedy. We do not, however, consider overdeterrence
with regard to proximity to drug transactions as somehow decreas-
ing desirable conduct. At best, it would offend an abstract right to
loiter in' a truly marginal fashion. Overdeterrence of white-collar
crime in capital markets is different in that it will often decrease
activity we hope to encourage. For example, conviction of a per-
son for insider trading when the information was not obtained by
illegal conduct would be more than a miscarriage of justice and a
personal tragedy. It would also decrease desirable conduct: it
would also deter others from trading on information similarly
85. United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), amended, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied sub nom. Zarecki v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2273 (1992); see supra
text accompanying notes 64-67.
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obtained, which would make the pricing mechanism of capital
markets less efficient.
Prosecutors using laws that regulate capital markets should be
as obliged to consider the effect on capital markets of the prece-
dents they set as they are to detect and prosecute criminal con-
duct. The present relentless drive to increase the discretionary
power of individual prosecutors moves in entirely the wrong direc-
tion.
A similar culture often infects the conduct of regulators of
capital markets. 6 They too want ample authority to snare those
whom they perceive to be wrongdoers and to pursue the regulato-
ry policy agenda.' They fear that bright lines mean loopholes
and circumvention of the underlying regulatory policy. The argu-
ment that small first steps are appropriate, that rules that prove to
be underinclusive can later be broadened, often does not appeal
to regulators. Regulators, and prosecutors as well, may have a
short-term view because they cannot guarantee their ability to
alter the rules at a later time. In other cases, regulators' belief
that certain kinds of conduct are undesirable may be firmer than
their reasoning as to why that is so. Consider insider trading. The
SEC and the Congress have taken many steps to eliminate insider
trading.' Unfortunately, they have failed to promulgate a defini-
tion of the conduct that they believe must be eliminated at all
costs.89 The reasons for this failure are sharp disagreements and
confusion over why insider trading is bad; definition of the con-
duct to be prohibited cannot, of course, proceed without a com-
mon understanding of why it is undesirable. A failure to define
86. See JAMEs D. COX Er AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 26
(1991) (stating that "the [SEC] jealously seems to preserve the largest degree of discre-
tion to sanction conduct that it determines, after the fact, to have been improper").
87. "The SEC . .. has failed to promulgate rules outside the area of tender offers
but its decisions have continued to march, in the eyes of one commentator, to the beat
of its own drummer." United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576 (1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
88. Many commentators have discussed the weapons available to the regulators,
which include criminal and civil measures such as injunctions, disgorgement, and treble
damages. See, eg., Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUTKE L. 960 (discussing, inter alia,
treble damages sanction).
89. "rThe SEC has, apart from Rule 14e-3, foregone the opportunity to use its
rulemaking power to define what insider trading is." Chestman, 947 F.2d at 572 (Winter,
3., dissenting).
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the conduct prohibited is not only unfair, but, moreover, may
deter beneficial conduct.
Finally, the courts also indulge in drawing rules that are not
accurate guides for conduct. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,90 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court dismissed as meritless the argument
that bright lines should be drawn, where feasible, to guide corpo-
rations in complying with certain disclosure obligations. That case
involved the circumstances in which a corporation must disclose
the existence of negotiations regarding a merger with another
company. Because this is a recurrent problem under the federal
securities laws, it would have been possible to fashion a rule that
gave considerable guidance to companies as to when such negotia-
tions should be disclosed. The lower federal courts had done just
that, holding that disclosure was required only after an agreement
in principle had been reached. The Supreme Court rejected that
approach and adopted the amorphous rule that disclosure is re-
quired when the magnitude of the event discounted by the proba-
bility of its occurrence would be of significance to investors.9
The Court reasoned that any bright line would be underinclu-
sive, overinclusive, or both.' In essence, the Court held that
whether a matter need be disclosed or whether a particular disclo-
sure is adequate must be determined ex post. There is logic in that
position, but it fails the reality test. Where the law is deliberately
unclear, a corporation cannot know whether it must disclose until
a court rules. Moreover, where the law is deliberately unclear, any
disclosure made regarding ambiguous events, such as merger nego-
tiations, will arguably be misleading or inadequate. The corpora-
tion, no matter how sincere its desire to comply with the law, will
thus face a costly class action whether it discloses or not, as long
as a claim of damages sufficient to support a significant award of
attorney's fees can be asserted. The number of class actions has
increased dramatically since Basic, in part because it failed to
appreciate the value of bright lines.93
90. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
91. Id. at 238-29 & n.16.
92. Id. at 238-41.
93. The Supreme Court's adoption of a "fraud on the market" theory in Basic may
be at least partially responsible for the dramatic increase in securities litigation in the
years since the decision. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud
in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 663 (1992).
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It is, moreover, exceedingly doubtful that investors receive
any benefit from being protected by a vague underinclusive or
overinclusive rule. Once a legal rule regarding disclosure is in
place and understood, investors, or at least the professionals who
set share prices, will adjust their thinking to that rule.
II. PROTECIONISM
Our present legal system contains a web of rules protecting
corporate management from monitoring by shareholders, from
competition in the market for management control, and from the
enforcement of ordinary fiduciary principles. These rules affect
corporate performance adversely and constitute a deadweight loss
to those who invest in American business, thereby increasing the
cost of capital.
A. Limits on Institutional Investors
Where shareholders are large in number and geographically
diffuse, the cost of collective action in monitoring management
performance is prohibitive.94 Where such monitoring does not
occur, management enjoys considerable leeway, because it can
retain its positions notwithstanding subpar performance, at least
until the price of the stock renders a takeover by purchase of a
control block feasible. The point at which management must be
wary of a hostile takeover depends in turn on the legal system
surrounding the market for management control. Of that, more
later.9'
One method of overcoming the collective action problem is
for a substantial block of stock to be acquired in one hand. A
large shareholder can monitor management directly, or several
large blocks acting in concert may work to the same end.' How-
ever, as Professor Roe has noted, American law places substantial
restrictions upon the acquisition by institutional investors of large
blocks of stock in particular companies. 7 Commercial banks thus
94. See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 6, at 66-67; MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACION 53-57 (1965).
95. See infra Section B.
96. See Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Share-
holders in Publicly Held Corporations, 20 . FIN. ECON. 317, 333-45 (1988).
97. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10, 16-31 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, That Menace, the
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may not hold equity shares,98 and mutual funds' and insurance
companies'0° are subject to a variety of laws limiting the percent-
age of stock they may hold in any particular corporation.01
There are also legal rules that place limits on concerted action
by large shareholders or groups of shareholders. Federal proxy
rules have long limited communications among more than ten
shareholders.1" The SEC recently adopted regulations liberaliz-
ing this restriction, but the new regulations have been criticized as
ambiguous and possibly cosmetic." a Under Rule 13d-5, share-
holders constituting more than five percent of a class of stock may
not agree to vote together without registering their actions with
the SEC and disclosing considerable information, including their
plans. °4 Worse yet, any group of institutional investors acting in
concert may be treated as a fen-percent shareholder under section
16(b) of the 1934 Act and thus be severely restrained in their
trading in the company's stock-a substantial intrusion upon the
institution's normal trading." a
Small Shareholder, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1992, at A12 [hereinafter Roe, That Menace];
see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
551-56 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1313 (1991).
98. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335 (1988); Roe, Political Theory, supra note 97, at 17-18.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1988) (fund may not advertise itself as diversified if it
owns more than ten percent of any one company or if it places more than five percent
of its unregulated assets in the stock of one company); I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(A)(ii) (1992)
(limiting tax breaks to nondiversified funds); Roe, Political Theory, supra note 97 at
19-22.
100. See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1198-1199 (limiting insurance company's investment
in one corporation to ten percent of the insurance company's assets); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 1405(a)(6), (8), 1705(a)(2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990) (establishing a similar limit
of two percent); Roe, Political Theory, supra note 97, at 22-23.
Pension funds, another source of institutional investment and potential monitoring,
are also subject to such restrictions. See ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988) (limiting
acquisition and holding of employer securities by certain plans).
101. To the degree that they inhibit the formation of large blocks of shares, such
restrictions also deter takeovers and impair the discipline and monitoring of capital mar-
kets, as described in Section B.
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1992) (now codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-2(b)(2)); see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC "Overregulation" of Proxy Con-
tests, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 31, 1991, at 5.
103. See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,290-91 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
9 240.14a-2(b)(1)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Proxy Contests: The Shape of the Future, N.Y.
LJ., Oct. 1, 1992, at 5 ("Well-intended as this new exemption [14a-2(b)(1)] is, the barri-
ers to open communication among shareholders remain considerable and uncertain.").
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988); see also Rule 13g, 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
105. Groups subject to Section 16(b) must disgorge profits from purchases and sales
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These rules, which appear not to have counterparts in the
legal systems of our major competitor nations,"° thus impede
equity holders from monitoring management performance. ' °7 By
reducing the incentives for corporate management to perform
efficiently, these restrictions lessen the return to investors in
American companies relative to the return to investors in compa-
nies in other legal systems.
These restrictions may also affect the temporal perspective of
investors. Holders of large blocks of stock in a company are in a
better position to demand and acquire high-quality information
about the company than are shareholders with insignificant blocks.
Large shareholders may demand and acquire access to all of a
company's books and its personnel; others must rely on publicly
disclosed data. The quality of information in turn affects the
amount by which investors will discount a future expected return
for risk. Because risk increases with time, increasing the quality of
information in the possession of investors will ratchet investments
in a longer-run direction; decreasing the quality of information will
rachet investments in a shorter-run direction. As Professor Roe
has noted, therefore, the policy of impairing the acquisition of
large blocks of stock may be one source of the frequently heard
complaints about the short-run outlooks of American institutional
investors. 8
Earlier, I mentioned that the Sentencing Guidelines provide
for draconian fines against corporations that violate certain regula-
of stock within six-month periods. The statute includes "any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a
debt previously contracted." 15 U.S.C. § 78p; Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-26333,
35-24768, 1988 SEC LEXIS 2380 (Dec. 2, 1988); see Symposium, Mutual Funds as Inves-
tors of Large Pools of Money, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1967).
106. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
89, 97-99 (1990) (comparing operation of U.S. capital markets to foreign markets operat-
ing under different regulatory regimes, specifically Japan); Roe, Political Theory, supra
note 97, at 10-11.
107. MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 46, 50-51 (1976) (only one-third of largest industrial companies have a stockholder
with a ten-percent ownership interest); Roe, That Menace, supra note 97, at A12:
In America, none of the largest 15 publicly traded companies in the U.S. has a
financial institution or group that owns as much as 20% of the company's
stock, and only rarely does a financial institution own more than 1%. But in
Japan, every one of the country's largest companies is controlled by a group of
financial institutions that hold an aggregate of 20% of the company's stock.
108. Roe, Political Theory, supra note 97, at 12-15, 54-57.
[Vol. 42:945
COST OF CAPITAL
tory statutes.1 9 The theory of the Guidelines is that because the
fines must ultimately be borne by investors, the investors will
cause the corporation to take prophylactic measures.10 Yet, were
a group of institutional investors to act in concert in pursuing that
goal, they would encounter the restrictions described above.
B. Restrictions on the Market for Management Control
As a result of the restrictions on the creation of, or concerted
action by, large blocks of shareholders, the American corporate
system more than the systems of other nations has come to rely
on the market for management control and on the threat of hos-
tile takeovers for monitoring corporate performance. However, the
market for management control is almost certainly less efficient
than direct monitoring by equity holders. Because institutional
investors are barred from holding large blocks of shares in corpo-
rations, the market for management control is necessarily thin.'
Although the popular press uses terms like "merger-mania""'
and the like, the number of actual or potential takeovers in any
given year is not large relative to the number of corporate busi-
nesses. Moreover, the information costs of a hostile takeover are
high."' One reason that LBO firms that deal only in friendly
109. See supra Section I(B); see also SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,474 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989) (Drexel eventually
paid $660 million in fines). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (corporate
crimes); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing
Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247 (1991).
As severe as these penalties are, they are more restrained than originally planned.
Anxious to portray itself as "tough on lawbreakers," the Sentencing Commission's prelim-
inary draft of the guidelines set fines as high as $364 million and allowed for a corporate
"probation" under which courts would assume control of the daily operations of the firm.
Tracy Thompson, Corporations Face Stiffer Sentencing: Panel Gets Tough on Lawbreakers,
WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1989, at Bi.
110. Saltzburg, supra note 34, at 430. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1988)
(directing the sentencing court to consider "the need for the sentence imposed to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct"); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy
for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
513, 523 (1989).
111. David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L REV. 701, 708-09 (1987); Roe, Political Theory, supra note 97, at 55.
112. See, e.g., Deirdre Fanning, The Executive Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at C23.
113. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Ten-
der Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions];
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisehel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1178 (1981) [hereinafter
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transactions have prospered-although the so-called friendly trans-
actions may be the result of threats from elsewhere-is that LBO
firms may be afforded full access to company books and personnel
by the targets. n4 Hostile acquirers are afforded no such luxury.
Also, even this backstop method of monitoring management is
impaired by many legal restrictions. The Williams Act, by delaying
consummation of tender offers, serves to alert target management
to the possibility of a takeover and to give it time to mount de-
fensive measures.-' By requiring offerors to disclose information
about themselves, their resources, and their intentions, the Wil-
liams Act forces offerors to share costly information with compet-
ing acquirers."6 For example, the very fact that a hostile offeror
regards a particular company as a target for a takeover is itself
information that is extremely valuable and costly to produce.
Moreover, the Williams Act contains provisions requiring equal
payment to all tendering shareholders"7 and a pro rata acquisi-
tion of tendered shares,' requirements that impair an offeror's
ability to bargain for large blocks of stock.
There are also numerous state laws that impose various kinds
of restrictions on those seeking to acquire control of a corpora-
tion. These laws have been passed at the behest of local corporate
management,119 and the bulk of empirical studies suggest that
Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role].
114. See, e.g., GEORGE E. ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT. KKR AND THE MORT-
GAGING OF AMERICAN BusiNEss 26-27 (1992) (describing one company's decision to
allow KKR access to the company's "most sensitive internal data").
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1992) (requiring that tender offers be held open for at
least 20 business days); id. § 240.14e-l(b) (requiring the offer to stay open an additional
10 days if the terms of the offer change).
116. Id. § 240.13d-l(a) (requiring beneficial owners of more than five percent of a
class of equity securities to disclose their backgrounds, sources of funding, and purposes
of their acquisitions, including any plans or proposals regarding control of the issuer); id.
§ 240.14d-4(c) (requiring disclosure to shareholders, including prompt disclosure of any
material changes). Such regulation decreases the returns on, and thus the frequency of,
investor monitoring and hostile bids. See generally Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley,
The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L &
ECON. 371 (1980); Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regu-
latory Process, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 131 (1987).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
118. Id. § 240.14d-8.
119. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV.
111, 136-38 (1987).
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they have caused the value of affected corporations to be dimin-
ished by billions of dollars.'
Congress has also imposed low visibility restrictions on junk
bonds, securities that often facilitate takeovers and the creation of
new companies. Savings and loan associations were forced to sell
all their junk bonds at the bottom of the market. Amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code tax the exchange of junk bonds for
other securities during corporate reorganizations; 21 and, finally,
the Federal Reserve has sought to limit use of junk bonds by
regulation.' Junk bonds are not an obvious item for regulation
in the name of investor protection. They are high-yield instru-
ments purchased by the most sophisticated of investors, and many
studies reveal them to be profitable.'23
A final aspect of the American legal system that raises the
cost of capital is management's freedom from any fiduciary obliga-
tion to refrain from defensive measures against hostile takeovers
that always involve a substantial premium over market price. This
was hardly an inevitable development. According to well-estab-
lished doctrine, where corporate directors or officers may benefit
from a corporate transaction, courts will independently scrutinize
the fairness of that transaction. 24 Based on this doctrine, courts
could easily have held that when a hostile tender offer has been
made, target management, which stands to lose either its jobs or
120. EASTERBROOK & FIscHEL, supra note 6, at 197-98, 209-11; Roberta Romano,
The Genius of American Corporate Law (Jan. 12, 1993) (working paper, on file with
Yale Law School).
121. See Patricia L. Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1039,
1043 & n.21 (1987).
122. See Securities Credit by Persons Other than Banks, Brokers, or Dealers, 12
C.F.R. § 207.112 (1992) (explaining that "shell corporations" may not issue debt securities
to finance more than 50% of the purchase price of a takeover); Bank Holding Compa-
nies and Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted Capital
Measure, 51 Fed. Reg. 3976, 3977-78 (1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (pro-
posed Jan. 31, 1986) (proposing risk-based capital requirements linking primary capital to
categories of assets judged to have varying default risks); Monica Langley et al., Chang-
ing the Rules: Attacking Junk Bonds, Fed Becomes a Player in the Takeover Game, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 1985, § 1, at 1; Nathaniel C. Nash, U.S. Regulators Want Banks to Cover
Risky Loans Better, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1986, at Al.
123. See, e.g., Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Kleim, Lower-Grade Bonds: Their
Risks and Returns, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1987, at 26; John J. Curran, Fewer Jitters
About Junk Bonds: The Risks of Default on the Low-Rated Securities, New Evidence
Suggests, Are Slim in Relation to the Fat Yields, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 337, 340.
124. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 219 (Del. 1976). See generally LEWIS D.
SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND PoLIcY 713-14 (2d ed. 1988).
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its freedom in running the company, may not do more than give
its views to shareholders as to whether to tender their shares."z
Alternatively, courts could have allowed management to conduct a
fair auction of the company. A debate over the desirability of
auctions is ongoing 26-- although outpaced by Delaware deci-
sions-and the courts would have had to fashion rules governing
the conduct of such auctions. Nevertheless, even the opponents of
auctions would agree that the alternative position is far superior to
the law as it has actually developed.
Delaware courts have generally allowed management to en-
gage in defensive measures that amount to a restraint on the
alienation of shares. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,z7 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that where management reasonably
perceives a takeover to be a threat to corporate policy, it may
engage in defensive measures proportional to the perceived
threat." Subsequent decisions allow the use of defensive mea-
sures such as poison pills, without a shareholder vote, even where
no actual hostile tender offer has been made. 29
The explanation for these decisions-to the extent any is
given-is that the proposed transaction is a fundamental corporate
change, for which management has some responsibility under the
business judgment rule.1" However, the business judgment rule
is intended to benefit shareholders by deterring overcautious be-
havior by management, not to allow management to override
shareholder decisions as to their best interests. Controlling who
,may own shares of a corporation is not a decision regarding the
125. This passivity thesis is described by Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra
note 113, at 1201.
126. See eg., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Tender
Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Tender
Offers]; Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover
Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 27 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 819, 869-75 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982) [hereinafter Gilson, Seek-
ing Competitive Bids]; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 209-11 (listing
additonal sources).
127. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
128. Id. at 955.
129. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
130. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; see Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 113,
at 1194-95.
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conduct of the business. Indeed, the view that management can
prevent shareholders from selling their shares, particularly at a
premium over market price, is based on an unspoken assumption
that the corporation is an entity with interests that diverge from
those of its shareholders.
Most seem to agree that corporate management may not
engage in defensive measures solely to retain control and its posi-
tion in the company."' One vice of Unocal, however, is that it
failed to recognize that any lawyer with moderate skills can create
a corporate record justifying defensive measures. There is virtually
no way for a court to distinguish between defensive measures
generated by a desire to retain office and defensive measures
generated to preserve a corporate policy without regard to who
retains office. 32
Nevertheless, after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court for a
time seemed ready to force management, when it engaged in
defensive measures, at least to auction the firm. 33 As I have
noted, there are respectable arguments, pro and con, as to wheth-
er encouraging auctions is an efficient policy; those arguments
have, however, become largely irrelevant in light of a Delaware
decision allowing corporate management to "just say no."
In Paramount Communications v. Time Inc.,"M Paramount
sued to cause Time's board to redeem a poison pill so that Time's
shareholders could accept Paramount's $200 all shares, all cash
offer. Time's board had refused to redeem the pill, based on its
view that a combination with Warner was more valuable than a
combination with Paramount. The Delaware Supreme Court held
131. See Bebchuk, Tender Offers, supra note 126, at 24 ("All the participants in this
exchange agree that management should be barred from obstructing tender offers.");
Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions, supra note 113, at 2-3 (explaining that Gilson and
Bebchuk agree "that defensive stratagems for the purpose of preserving the target's inde-
pendence ... reduce investors' wealth"); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids, supra note
126, at 52 ("Taken together, our respectiire articles demonstrate that there is no coherent
justification for allowing target management to engage in defensive tactics that may de-
prive shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares."). Even Delaware courts
give at least lip service to this.
132. But see Robert M. Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The
Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE LJ. 577, 604 (1992) (review essay)
(proposing a legal rule that would distinguish loyal from disloyal management resistance).
133. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986).
134. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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that it was not a breach of the Time board's fiduciary obligations
to refuse to redeem the pill.
The facts of the case were rather egregious. Once the Para-
mount offer had failed, Time's shares dropped to $66, a massive
loss to Time's shareholders.13 In addition, the court ignored
clear conflicts of interest in Time's management. At all times, the
sticking points in the Time-Warner negotiations were questions as
to who would retain office and at what salaries. As finally negoti-
ated, the merger with Warner included employment contracts for
Time's management that had not been part of the Paramount
offer. Moreover, the deal had originally been fashioned as an
exchange of shares, and Time's representatives had bragged to the
President of the United States and the United States Senate that
the new corporation would not be laden with debt." However,
once Paramount's bid was launched, Time had to fashion the deal
as a purchase of Warner to avoid a vote by Time's shareholders.
The result was precisely a debt-laden corporation with a weakened
financial structure. Finally, although Time attempted to justify the
merger with Warner as necessary to preserve its "culture" of jour-
nalistic integrity and independence, 37 the merger agreement
failed to contain terms that guaranteed continuation of the Time
tradition of isolating Time Magazine's editor-in-chief from corpo-
rate pressure or influence.3
The Delaware court held that, in such circumstances, manage-
ment is free to pursue defensive measures that prevent sharehold-
ers from selling their shares to a buyer willing to pay well above
existing market price .13 The rationale of the decision rejects as
unreliable the pricing of capital markets. The court thus stated
that "it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the
present stock market price of shares is not representative of true
value or that there may indeed be several market values for any
corporation's stock."1" The court also suggested that manage-
ment might reasonably conclude-and act on the conclusion-that
135. CLURMAN, supra note 54, at 246.
136. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1145-47.
137. Id. at 1143 n.4, 1148.
138. CLURMAN, supra note 54, at 203-04.
139. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148-50.
140. Id. at 1150 n.12.
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Time's investors were ignorant in believing that Paramount's $200
offer was preferable to Time's purchase of Warner.14'
The court was correct that there are many ways to value
investments, 142 but the valuation often depends on the purpose
for which the valuation is being made. In an eminent domain
proceeding involving a piece of property for which there is a very
thin market, one may have to engage in considerable speculation
and rely on the judgment of experts who can offer only fair guess-
es. Where there is a market of ready buyers and sellers, the mar-
ket price, which reflects buyers' and sellers' present understandings
as well as future expectations, should prevail. Any notion of value
that ignores the views of ready buyers and sellers-so-called "in-
trinsic value"-has been rightly described as "earth is flat" reason-
ing.14
3
Time's problem was not that its shareholders were obtuse.
Time's problem was that the entire capital market-investors ev-
erywhere-valued the Time purchase of Warner as worth less than
the merger with Paramount. Otherwise, the price of Time's shares
would have risen above $200 as canny investors bought from
Time's ignorant shareholders.
Certainly, expert testimony is not a substitute for a readily
ascertainable market price. One expert in the Time-Warner litiga-
tion predicted a post-merger share price low of $133 ($67 off) and
a high of $402 in 1993 (miracles can happen).'" In fact, a pre-
diction of a high of $133 would have been overly optimistic. An-
other analyst, employed by an investment group that was the
largest shareholder of both Time and Warner, opined that the
Time-Warner merger was more valuable than the Paramount of-
fer. 14  Meanwhile, the group itself was dumping its Time
shares."4
As Delaware law now stands, investors are free to sell their
shares at the going market price. However, if a shareholder wants
to sell to a buyer seeking control and offering a premium of fifty
141. Ia. at 1148, 1153.
142. Id. at 1150 n.12.
143. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 207.
144. CLURMAN, supra note 54, at 246 (prediction of Bruce Wasserstein, Time's invest-
ment banker).
145. Id. at 247 (opinion of Gordon Crawford, of the Los Angeles-based Capital
Group funds).
146. Id. at 231.
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percent above market price, management may prevent the sale.
What a country.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, derivative and class actions survive in their
present form even though there is little evidence that they benefit
investors either through monetary recovery or the deterrence of
management from fiduciary breaches or other illegal acts. The
only explanation for their survival appears to be the profits they
provide to the legal profession. Even more so, civil RICO appears
to exist largely to benefit lawyers. Without any conscious intent or
evident purpose, civil RICO has displaced well-established com-
mon law rules regarding damages, federalized a wide range of
state law claims, and perhaps supplanted established federal securi-
ties law remedies. Civil RICO reduces the return to investors by
increasing legal costs and imposing unnecessary liability, thereby
decreasing the level of commercial activity. It is proving, however,
to be a fount of work for lawyers.
Harsh sentences under the Guidelines, overly broad defini-
tions of federal criminal laws, and the power to impose forfeiture
also exist largely for the convenience of one segment of the legal
profession, namely prosecutors. Some commentators state that
Congress tends to throw money at problems.147 When it lacks
money and is under pressure to act, it also throws prosecutors at
problems and creates areas of discretionary power far in excess of
any demonstrated need. Between the breadth of the fraud and
money laundering laws, probably every business in the United
States could be the subject of at least a partial forfeiture proceed-
ing for essentially trivial conduct. Even a partial forfeiture may
doom the company, injuring innocent investors and employees.
Overbroad doctrine, moreover, may deter beneficial conduct. The
failure of prosecutors, regulators, and the courts to seek legal rules
with bright lines also raises the cost of capital by generating costly
litigation.
The policy of fragmenting shareholders and preventing con-
certed action by them exists largely for the benefit of corporate
managers who can, as a result, avoid effective monitoring of their
performance. As Professor Roe has said, these restrictions may
147. See eg., Roe, Political Theory, supra note 97, at 45-53.
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have been adopted in the name of decreasing economic concentra-
tion, but their continued existence is due to the political power of
corporate management." Of course, restrictions on monitoring
cannot bestow immortality on a business; an inefficient manage-
ment can only prolong the business's decline. In the interim, how-
ever, as in the case of General Motors, much wealth is lost, and
the lives of many ordinary citizens dependent on the firm are
disrupted. There are methods of circumventing the barriers to
monitoring, notably the emergence of LBO firms that take over
control of companies, but such methods are costly and the free-
dom of management to thwart hostile takeovers has lessened their
effectiveness.
Restrictions on takeovers, such as the Williams Act and state
anti-takeover laws, and restrictions on junk bonds, shield corporate
management from competitive processes. At the same time, the
freedom of management to employ defensive measures that pre-
vent shareholders from accepting hostile tender offers also benefits
corporate management and diminishes the return to investors.
Of course, there are also ways to contract around decisions
like Time-Warner. A legal system that announces that management
can thwart investors' decisions to sell on the ground that investors
are ignorant cannot be expected to attract capital as easily as a
legal system that allows investors to act on their own judgment.
To put it bluntly, investors are not as dumb as the Delaware
Supreme Court thinks. Investors who know in advance that they
may be deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premi-
um will pay less for such shares. Moreover, were a state to
emerge with established law preventing such defensive measures, it
might attract corporate chartering business from Delaware. Finally,
one way of contracting around decisions like Time-Warner is to
invest in companies that are not subject to the American legal
system.
What must be done? Derivative and class actions must be
made to pay their way, as it were. Some mechanism, perhaps
along the lines I suggested earlier,149 must be adopted that
weeds out meritless claims at the threshold, prevents claims that
148. IM.
149. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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cannot benefit investors from going forward, does not overcom-
pensate weak claims, and does not undercompensate strong claims.
It is probably too late in the day to hope for a narrowing of
doctrine under the mail and wire fraud statutes. However, we
might at least seek to narrow legislation authorizing forfeiture to
situations in which innocent investors will not be injured.
Civil RICO should be repealed or limited to injuries suffered
at the hands of inherently criminal organizations. Prosecutors must
adopt detailed guidelines as to the circumstances in which capital
market regulations will be enforced through criminal proceedings,
which must be followed by individual prosecutors.
The acquisition of large blocks of stocks in companies should
not be restricted. The threat to the American economy is not
domestic economic concentration; it is poorly performing compa-
nies. Caselaw permitting management to take actions that restrain
the sale of shares by shareholders should be overturned. I am
optimistic about this. Delaware is a premier corporate state and its
caselaw is thus very disappointing. Nevertheless, Delaware is the
only state with a caselaw that allows management such freedom to
thwart shareholders' desire to sell to a hostile offeror. That
caselaw is not entirely consistent with existing law regarding
management's fiduciary obligations in situations in which it may
profit from a corporate transaction. It also is based on a wholly
invalid notion that a corporation has an intrinsic value separate
from the valuations of ready buyers and sellers. Indeed,
Delaware's Supreme Court is far more hostile to takeovers than
its legislature, and a prior Delaware decision that emphasized the
notion of intrinsic value in a different context has become irrele-
vant through legislative action. If other states decline to follow
Time-Warner, the Delaware court may reconsider. In any event, a
legal regime that is so obviously at odds with the welfare of inves-
tors is not likely to survive long.
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